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Book Review: The Fascist Party and Popular Opinion in
Mussolini’s Italy
In The Fascist Party and Popular Opinion in Mussolini’s Italy, Paul Corner re-
examines the experience of Italy during Mussolini’s fascist regime. Based largely on
unpublished archival material, the book concludes by suggesting that the abuse of power by
fascists mirrors much wider problems in Italy related to the relationship between the public and
the private and to the modes of utilisation of power, both in the past and in the
present. Massimo Mangilli-Climpson finds the book contains a well-argued discussion
raising a number of new points about the country’s development in the early 20th century.
The Fascist Party and Popular Opinion in Mussolini’s Italy. Paul Corner.
Oxford University Press. July 2012.
Find this book: 
In the early 1970s, Italy topped the charts in industrial disputes. I recall several
old-timers nostalgically whispering that conditions were so dif f erent when
there was order, the trains ran on time, and it was possible to be proud to be
Italian af ter the country’s f ootball team twice became World Cup champions in
the 1930s. I wondered if  later on they had cheered in April 1945 when Mussolini
and his mistress, Claretta Petacci, were hung up at a petrol station in the
centre of  Milan.
Paul Corner ’s The Fascist Party and Popular Opinion in Mussolini’s Italy f irst
questions the old theory that it was the Second World War which brought
down the Fascist dictatorship. Even bef ore the killing started in June 1940,
Corner, Prof essor of  European History at the University of  Siena, f eels the Fascist Party (PNF)
was experiencing in f ull what Robert O. Paxton (2004) described as “entropy”, the f inal stagnant
phase of  all totalitarian regimes.
By going back to the movement’s origins and his own still pioneering research on Fascism in Ferrara (1974),
Corner points to the weaknesses already prevalent bef ore Mussolini’s “March on Rome” in October
1923. The PNF made grandiose claims of  establishing a new national centralized system f rom the
grassroots, to replace the old corrupt Liberal democracy which had encouraged local parochial and
conf lictual polit ics. On the contrary, the local f ascio and provincial “f ederal” sections had been
superimposed onto the local social and economic territory, without ef f ecting any social changes. Unlike
Nazism, much evidence showed that there was no homogeneous national image of  Fascism; everything
was seen through a particular local-provincial orbit.
Until the murder of  Socialist leader Giacomo Matteotti in 1924, the intransigents believed that having
ef f ected the “Revolution”, and now in power, they had the right and might to run things as they wished and
pick up the f ruits. Despite needing such thugs, the Duce was astute enough to realise that violence and
lively “autonomous” party sections were a personal danger, and that they threatened his own power base,
stability and f uture. With his Party secretaries, Turati, Giurati, and Starace, his response was to
subordinate the PNF to the state, and to widen its scope as educator and organizer of  the masses through
its capillary organizations: the Fascist unions; the Dopolavoro (OND) with its imposing af ter-work centres;
the social insurance, and health and care agencies af f ecting ordinary peoples’ lives f rom the cradle to the
grave; and the Balilla (ONB) or the youth, and (GUF) university movements.
Corner admits the novelty, the progressive vision and the scale of  these schemes in a largely agrarian
country. He also notes the impressive, well-organized mobilization in public of  mass rallies (he enjoys
Bottai’s picturesque expression of  the Party herding cattle), as well as the attempt to present a national
patriotic image f or everything Fascist. However, the weight of  evidence and the constant repetit ive slant
marks him as less as an impartial a-Fascist, and more in the tradit ional anti-Fascist post-war camp.
The new Party became one of  f unctionaries, who were called upon to repeat like thoughtless children
empty emotive dogmatic commands, such as “Believe, Obey, Fight”, as well as enrolling and checking its
members. They were never involved in training its cadres f or ef f icient prof essional public service, nor
encouraging polit ical discussion or thought among the population. Throughout the late 1920s and 30s the
author shows the local provincial leaders, the f ederali, the length and breadth of  Italy were either in virtual
permanent conf lict with the central party directorate, or with the state authorit ies, the pref ecture and the
comuni, through the f igures of  the pref ect and his non-elected mayoral appointee, the podestà. In contrast
to Nazi Germany where the Nazi Party led and the Reichsstatthalter combined both party and state roles, in
Italy there was a conf lict of  f unctions, with of f icials eager to expand their powers beyond their duties.
Threats of  censure, temporary or permanent suspension, expulsion f rom the party, or even their
banishment to distant, isolated regions, the conf ino, as Carlo Levi described in his autobiography Christ
stopped at Eboli, and their replacement with outsiders – Rome’s “f oreign” nominees f rom outside the
province, did not suf f ice to bring them to heel. They believed, without the f ear of  a Night of  the Long
Knives, that even if  expelled, they and their supporters would one day succeed in inf luencing a change f rom
within, with the replacement of  higher of f icials: the pref ect, right up to the national party secretary.
Tullio Tamburini, head of  the intransigent Florentine squadristi, was expelled in 1925, but later experienced
f ull rehabilitation to polit ical lif e and even held high ministerial of f ice in the 1930s. Bernando Barbiellini-
Amedei, leader in Piacenza, f aced expulsion, reinstatement, and then was re-expelled again, all within f ive
years.
Such f actional and personal inf ighting, better known  as “Beghism”, not only generated a poor image of  the
Party and thus the regime, it blocked the f low of  f unds coming to the administration, preventing the Party
f rom ef f ectively carrying out its prescribed services, so discrediting it f urther.
Corner ’s analytical examination then questions how much more acceptable Mussolini’s 1974 biography, by
Renzo De Felice, is af ter nearly thirty years. The biography af f irmed that the height of  the regime’s
consensus f ollowed the military victory against Ethiopia, and the declaration of  the Italian Empire in May
1936. At the time, the Italian anti-Fascist historical and the polit ical lef t establishment f ound this idea most
repugnant and unacceptable to acknowledge f or a right-wing totalitarian system.
With the f ull use of  the party and state apparatus at the regime’s disposal, complete with of f icial party,
union, church and turned anti-Fascist inf ormers, as well as OVRA secret police in action, Beneduce’s
agency was f ar f rom being an amateur lackadaisical version of  the Gestapo, (no mention of  the NKGB, or
the Kempeitai). The people of ten presented themselves in public and cheered simply because that was
ordered, it was what everyone did, and they soon learned the risks of  individual dissent could be too great:
a beating, the loss of  social benef its or a job and with the loss of  a home, even serious dif f icult ies f or the
f amily. So no one can dispute it as litt le more than tacit outward expressions of  mobilized consent.
Though Corner agrees the Fascist dream f or a “place in the sun” in 1935, and the growing closeness with
Germany, put the country f irmly in the international sphere, he dates the pinnacle of  popular consent much
earlier: back to 1929, when “Fascist” Italy f inally became accepted by the Vatican, and the Catholic Church
with the signing of  the Lateran Pact. That brief  moment of  greatness soon vanished in the wake of  the
seemingly endless economic depression. More so, then, a distinct f eeling of  “them” and “us” arose: certain
Fascists were seen living and eating well in the good local restaurants, misusing of f icial cars in the
company of  mistresses, all at the expense of  the general public. Reports in the Party survive of  jealous
rivals continuing to inf orm on f ederali of  selling jobs to the needy unemployed, and tenders f or public
contracts, and then pocketing the proceeds in a very “un Fascistic behaviour”.
Until 1938 many convinced themselves that Mussolini was dif f erent f rom other Fascists, and in particular
f rom Starace; he was clean of  abuse or corruption. Indeed, the expression “se sapesse Mussolini”, or “if
only Mussolini knew” was f or long banded about. Af ter the init ial hurrah when the War was declared, brief ly
f using patriotism with national Fascist f eeling, f ears and gloom started to grip all classes. But it was now
the Fascists who voiced their greatest grievances and alarms (Why? Because they f elt pay back time was
f ast approaching?) – including f or the lack of  air-raid shelters being built in the cit ies; and with rumours of
various plots of  leading members of  the army and of  the monarchy planning to arrest a now less than
perf ect Duce. Interestingly enough given the prophetic correctness, were reports mentioning Badoglio f irst
in 1939 and again in 1941, but incredibly no action was pursued, and one wonders how history would have
unf olded had Badoglio actually been arrested?
Any plans by Party secretary Serena (until December 1941) and f or personnel committed to ref orm the
ailing Party and the regime in wartime seemed too litt le, and much too late. Perhaps Mussolini was too
preoccupied to care, though it is important to note that Hitler had his eye on the organised skills of
Farinacci as Mussolini’s likely successor, and not Ciano.
Corner underlines, however, that organized successes existed within the expanded parastate outside the
Party during the 1930s with the f ormation of  industrial and banking concerns, IRI and IMI, which survived the
war in the new Italian Republic, proving the creativity of  the Italian totalitarian system both to produce such
structures, discover and recruit competent non-polit ical staf f .
Returning to the irritated witnesses in the 1970s, as children who came of  age under Fascism, a system
which carried the seeds not only of  the dreaded sixty years of  Liberal democracy, but also those f urther
back in its national history, it is obvious not everything of  Fascism dissolved like snow in 1943 or 1945. The
author emphasizes that sociologists rather than historians have something old or new to explain to us
about the nature of  polit ical culture that gets passed on, of  polit ical castes, or on  provincialism,
characteristics of  the Republic, and even of  the separatist Northern League (LN).
This is a well-argued discussion that can either be read separately f rom or together with Paul Corner ’s
earlier collection of  edited essays Popular Opinion in Totalitarian Regimes.
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